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Abstract. This paper presents a comparative study of policy specification lan-
guages. Our objective is to find policy language or notation that is the most 
suitable to express the security aspects of distributed applications running on 
policy-based networks. We first made a selection of languages and we compare 
them on several criteria: their suitability to specify security, their ability to ex-
press both user and network oriented security aspects, the representation tech-
nique they use and the notions they are able to express. This paper concludes on 
a discussion on what would be the ideal policy language for distributed applica-
tions that have strong security constraints. 
1 Introduction 
The exponential use of distributed applications such as electronic commerce, video on 
demand and videoconferencing increases the complexity of control and management 
of resources provided by their networked environment. 
On one hand, the users and developers of those applications are aware of the require-
ments of their applications, in particular in terms of security and are willing to express 
them for the environment to take them into account. On the other hand the networks, 
in particular policy-based networks that are at the centre of our study, are more and 
more able to deal with all type of traffic and to provide a service ‘a la carte’. The 
bottleneck in this situation is a comprehension problem between the users and the 
network. 
Our objective is to find a way to specify security that is suitable to the users, the appli-
cations and their policy-based networked environment. To achieve this goal, we have 
selected the following security-oriented specification languages: ASL (Authorisation 
Specification Language) [18], Automated manager [31], DLSS (Deontic Logic-based 
Security Specification) [6], ISPS (IPsec Security Policy Specification) [12], LaSCO 
(Language for Security Constraints on Objects) [17], Ponder [7], SPSL (Security 
Policy Specification Language) [4] and Tower [16]. 
In addition to those security-oriented languages, we chose to study some QoS oriented 
languages. Indeed, security aspects of distributed applications are very often included 
in the Quality of Service (QoS) parameters. Therefore, to this extend, QoS-oriented 
languages allow to specify security requirements. The selected QoS-oriented specifi-
cation languages are: HQML (Hierarchical QoS Mark-up Language) [15], PDL (Poli-
cy Description Language) [2], [22], [34], PDN (Policy Definition Notation) [26], [27], 
PPL (Path-based Policy Language) [33], QML (Quality of service Modelling Lan-
guage) [9], [10], [11], [21], QuAL (Quality of service Assurance Language) [14], [36] 
and QuO (Quality Objects) - QDL (Quality Description Language) [23]. 
Some of those languages are not ‘policy’ languages (HQML, QML, QuAL, QuO-
QDL) but they have been selected because they contain features that we would like to 
find in an ideal policy language whose aim is to support application with strong secu-
rity constraints. 
 
This paper compares those languages on four important criteria. They are:  
 
• the suitability to specify security (Section 2). This criterion is essential since secu-
rity is at the centre of our concern,  
• the existence of different abstraction levels to represent policy and the possibility 
to map between these different levels (Section 3). This is an important feature for 
the language we need. It enables to bridge the gap between the user and its sup-
porting environment,  
• the representation technique used by the language to represent the policies (Sec-
tion 4). This criterion will have an influence on the policy expressiveness for the 
different users (end-users, administrators, etc.), 
• the notions used for the organisation of information in the language (Section 5). 
This gives an indication of the complexity of the language. 
 
Section 6 concludes on the interesting features that would be good to put together to 
create a complete policy language for secure distributed applications. 
2 Comparison on the Suitability to Specify Security 
This section studies the languages on their ability to specify the following security 
aspects: 
 
• Can access control be expressed? In this case, rules are defined to specify under 
what conditions a user or an element can access resources, information or other 
elements of the system. The majority of the selected security-oriented languages 
propose the specification of access control policies. These policies are often ex-
pressed in terms of positive and negative authorisations as in Automated Manag-
er, Ponder, ASL and DLSS. DSSL differentiates the authorisation and the permis-
sion to execute an action. An authorisation may be necessary, but not sufficient to 
get an explicit permission. In other words a user can be authorised to read pdf 
files but the owner of the file does not permit the access. Tower is based on the 
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) approach. In that approach security con-
straints are related to the roles played by the users and policies are expressed 
through permissions and privileges. The permissions are the conditions on which 
the security is applied and the privileges are the actions to execute. Other lan-
guages such as SPSL and ISPS provide another access control viewpoint with a 
fire walling role that stop non-authorised traffic. 
• Can identification/authentication be provided? Users are identified with their 
group or associated role – these notions are explained in more details in Section 5 
–, in other words at the entity creation within the system. They can also be identi-
fied within policies. For example in Ponder, it is possible to verify if the user be-
longs to a group within an authorisation policy: if belongs (user, group) then ac-
tion is authorised. However none of these languages provide the authentication. 
Only SPSL permits to create policies with this aspect but for communication se-
curity. It also provides another kind of authentication: the one of the persons who 
maintain the policies. 
• Can confidentiality and integrity be expressed? Those aspects are bound to 
communications and are available in SPSL and ISPS languages. They permit to 
express sets of security parameters that are required to secure the communication. 
They can be the algorithms used for encryption, the strength of encryption, the 
source and destination of the message, etc. 
• Can obligation and prohibition be expressed? These notions state that a user 
must or must not execute or be allowed to execute an action on an element as in 
ASL, Automated Manager, DLSS, PDL and Ponder. They force or forbid users to 
execute actions on elements. For instance, if user1 is not a doctor then read 
(medical records) is prohibited. 
• Is there a system audit? Obligation and refrain policies introduced in Ponder can 
react to system events such as time events or to events that are composed of spe-
cific operators. An example: if student connection after 8:00 p.m. then refrain 
connection. Here the event is the connection of the student after 8:00 p.m. This 
kind of policy can also be used in QoS management: if performance degradation 
then reserve bandwidth for user members of PremiumService. Automated Man-
ager, DLSS, LaSCO and PDL policies can also be enforced using the system au-
dit. 
• Is there a delegation technique? Delegation temporary transfers privileges to 
other user. This type of policy has a particular form, which can be: delegate set of 
privileges from user1 to user2 during time t. Only Ponder and DLSS provide this 
feature. 
 
Table 1 summarises the results. 












































access control          RBAC
identication - authentication      
integrity - confidentiality  
audit   
delegation  
obligation - prohibition      
 
Ponder is the most complete language to express security policy. An example of secu-
rity specification in this language is given in Table 2. It shows how to express the fact 
that there is a need to strongly secure an online payment through the use of an obliga-
tion policy (oblig keyword). The obligation policy reacts to an event (following the on 
keyword) that enables to detect the execution of an online payment from the client 
identified by its clientid, to the merchant identified by its merchantid. This policy 
enforcement is required by the subject that must be an end-user and is applied to the 
target (the traffic). The action to do follows the do keyword. Two actions are specified 
and separated by ‘|’. This operator indicates that the second action (error()) is per-
formed only if the first action fails. The purpose of the first action is to strongly secure 
the communication between the client and the merchant. 
Table 2. Ponder syntax example  
inst oblig SecureOnlinePayment { 
  on   OnlinePaymentUse(clientid, merchantid) 
  subject s = /EndUser 
  target t = /Traffic 
  do   securecommunication(clientid, merchantid, strong) | error() 
} 
3 Comparison on the Level of Abstraction and the Existence of 
Mapping and Feedback Mechanisms 
Security parameters and security policies can be specified at different level of abstrac-
tion.  
At the user and application levels (high level), the security specification enables to 
control the execution of applications and to specify the conditions and rights for the 
interaction between the users and their applications. High level policy generally refers 
to a declarative statement of what the end-user wants (a proposition or a single ac-
tion). An example of high level policy is given in Table 3.  
Table 3. High level policy example 
I (Sandrine) require a strong security protection for my e-commerce online pay-
ment. 
 
At the middleware and network levels (low level), the security specification enables to 
represent and to verify the constraints in the supporting environment. Low level policy 
representations are generally procedural and specify the logic of how to achieve the 
goal (as rules or program control flows that are evaluated to determine a sequence of 
actions that should be taken). An example is given in Table 4. The syntax of this poli-
cy is detailed in [13]. This low level policy is the result of a mapping of the high level 
policy of Table 3 in a particular environment. This environment supports the IPsec 
architecture and secures distributed application exchanges with policies. The policy 
depicted here requires the use of the IPsec ESP protocol and proposes several algo-
rithms (3DES for confidentiality and SHA-1 or MD5 for integrity), the tunnel mode 
and the anti-replay protection, to secure the communication between the IP addresses 
2.2.2.2 and 3.3.3.3. The application is identified by the port number (8000) the com-
munication direction (bi-directional) and the configuration type used (unicast). 
Table 4. Low level policy example 
IF SourceIPaddress = 2.2.2.2 and SourcePortNo = 8000 and DestinationIPAddress 
= 3.3.3.3 and DestinationPortNo = 8000 THEN CONNECT with bi-directional 
and unicast among 2.2.2.2 at 8000 and 3.3.3.3 at 8000 with AF11 and ESP with 
(3DES) and (SHA-1, MD5) and tunnel and Anti-Replay 
 
Abstraction levels differs from a language to another.  
All the languages we studied in this paper are able to specify security at middle-
ware/network level. However, to be really suitable for distributed applications security 
specification, they also need to be able to express user and application security re-
quirements. This supposes the existence of a user/application level of abstraction. 
HQML, QML, QuAL and QuO-QDL have that characteristic. 
In addition to the different level of abstraction, there is a need for a good mapping 
mechanism to go from one level to another. Policy classifications [28], [35], [38] and 
policy hierarchies [39] are ways to do this. Amongst the languages we have studied, 
only HQML, ISPS, QML, QuAL have those mechanisms. For example, in QML the 
refinement process is done using hierarchy between interfaces definitions (contract 
and profile type are refined in contracts and profiles instances). Automated Manager 
proposes a manual mapping mechanism.  
Ideally, the mapping mechanisms should be both ways since a feedback is necessary 
for the application to be able to adapt changes in its environment. If we go back to the 
example in Table 4, a feedback from the network could be: the 3DES algorithm is not 
available for the ESP protocol; and it could lead to the cancellation of the transaction 
specified in Table 3 since securing the communication becomes impossible. From the 
languages we studied, only HQLM proposes that feature. 
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4 Comparison on the Policy Representation Techniques 
In this section we present how the policies are represented in the different languages. 
This is important to identify the expressiveness and the flexibility of each one of them.  
Different approaches exist to specify policies. As mentioned in [7] we can group all 
the languages into three major approaches: a specification through a policy language, 
a specification through policy rules, and a specification through a logical language. 
The use of a language that is specifically made to express policy provides a consider-
able flexibility compared to the other approaches. The rule-based specification is 
generally linked to the IETF policy models [32], [29] and expresses policies through 
the following form: if E then A, where E represents some detectable event or network 
state, and A represents an action to be taken when E is detected. This kind of specifi-
cation often specifies low level policies. Finally the logical languages (deontic, real-
time or modal logic models) use the logical operators to represent the policies and is 
more complex to understand. 
 
In addition to the approach, there are different techniques to represent the policies: 
 
• Functional blocks: they are used to describe the class of policies or the applica-
tion and communication constraints. These classes are represented through specif-
ic structures like in PDN, QuAL, QuO and Tower, through object classes like in 
Ponder, QML and SPSL or through the use of a markup language syntax like in 
HQML. 
• Notation: these languages have developed a specific notation that is not linked to 
a specific structure (object, functional block, etc.). 
• Graphs: in this case policies are represented using direct graphs with annotations. 
The graph representation is used in several languages. LaSCO is completely 
based on graphs: the system to which the policy is applied consists of a series of 
events, each occurring between a pair of objects. A policy is applied through the 
identification of portions of a system to which policy applies. The requirements 
are checked on that portion of the system. Other models use graphs to represent a 
part of their policy specification. For example in HQML, graphs are used to rep-
resent the application configurations. 
• Path-based: the path based category indicates that is possible to specify in the 
policy the element composing the route as in PPL, or that can act on the traffic 
flow as in ISPS. 
 
In addition some languages are based on existing standard modelling language such as 
QML that is based on the UML (Unified Modelling Language) model or HQML that 
is specified in XML (Extensible Markup Language). 
 
Table 6 summarises this comparison. 












































Policy rules    
Policy language    
Logic-based  
Functional blocks    















5 Comparison on the Notions Used 
In this section, we study the different notions used in the languages. Synonyms and 
homonyms have been found in the different specification languages.  
 
A first notion we found is the group. Three types of groups can be distinguished: 
 
• Domain: A domain generally groups elements together (objects in Automated 
Manager, PDN and Ponder and network entities in PPL and SPSL) in order to 
apply a common set of policies on them. One main goal is to reduce the number 
of policies for scalability problem. A set of policies is not associated any more to 
an element but a group of elements. Elements can be grouped together according 
to geographical boundaries, object type, responsibility and authority or at the 
convenience of the managers. LaSCO introduces another definition of the domain 
notion. This language describes a domain as a specific system situation (e.g. a 
specific user doing a specific action on a specific target) under which the policy is 
applied. A domain is associated to a single policy. A similar definition is given in 
the Goal-Based model with the Goal Domain notion [1]. 
• Group of User: This notion is found in ASL. It is closely related to the notion of 
domain. It groups users together and the same policies are applied to the whole 
group. The major difference between the notion of group of users and domain is 
that the policies are included into the group. That is not the case for the domain. 
• Role: A role is linked to a set of rules describing the rights and duties associated 
to it. It refers to a position in an organisation. The position is often a human job 
function. We find this feature in ASL and Tower. In these two languages, a role is 
related to a particular user and can be activated and deactivated. However several 
users can play the same role and a user can have several roles. In ASL roles are 
organised hierarchically. Others languages permit to refer, in addition to job func-
tions, to positions as software or hardware (e.g.: core-router) like in Automated 
Manager or Ponder. In these languages the role is associated to a domain. In 
DLSS, the object class notion is closely related to the role. The object class repre-
sents a group of objets and contains a set of methods that describes the actions 
that are authorised. The Ponder language describes another mean to group poli-
cies together: the group. A group represents a set of policies and constraints with 
some semantic relationship (e.g. relating to a particular application). More com-
plex notions are also introduced such as the relationship – to create relations be-
tween roles – and the management structure – to represent for example a universi-
ty department by grouping together all the groups, roles and relationships con-
cerning this department –. 
 
In addition to the group, the following notions have been identified: 
 
• Goal. A goal enables to define the policies in relation to the objectives to be met. 
A desired behaviour or a state can represent these objectives in the system. In 
ISPS the word ‘goal’ is replaced by ‘requirement’ and refers to a high level objec-
tive. In PDL a goal level is defined to represent policies. Goal oriented level ena-
bles specifying objectives to meet in using templates of attributes specifying 
events, constraints and actions. A specific model described in [1] is completely 
based on this notion. In the Goal-Based model, a policy is defined as a collection 
of policy goals and/or policy rules that express certain desired system behaviour. 
Here there is a difference between goals and rules. A policy goal specifies what 
system behaviour is desired, that is, goals describe the desired system state, but 
not how to reach the desired state. A policy rule specifies action(s) to be taken to 
reach a desired state. 
• Profile. A profile represents the particular values (preferences or configurations) 
of some parameters. These configurations can be applied to users, applications or 
resources. In Policy-Driven [25] this notion is related to the user expectations. In 
QML, QoS profiles enable to correlate the application configurations that match 
the user’s requests and that could be supported by the client’s current resource 
conditions. QML profiles associate contracts with interfaces, operations, opera-
tion arguments and operation results. In QuO framework the notion of profile is 
used to define the contract between the client and an object. In HQML, profiles 
are realised through the application configuration. 
• Contract. In general a contract specifies an agreement between clients and serv-
ers. Different definitions have been found: in QML a contract represents a partic-
ular QoS specification within a given category. In QuO a contract between the 
client and an object specifies the level of service desired by the client, the level of 
service the object expects to provide, operating regions indicating possible 
measures, and actions to take when the level of service changes.  
 
Table 7 summarises the results. 




























































Domains      
of Users 
Roles     
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For distributed application such as e-commerce the best language does not exist yet. It 
should be a mix of 
• Ponder, ISPS and SPSL for the suitability for specification of security. Ponder is 
the more complete language. However it cannot express the communication secu-
rity unless calling a predefined function. For the security of communication ISPS 
and SPSL are available. SPSL is the most suitable for IPsec policy specification. 
But ISPS is easier to understand. 
• HQML for its different abstraction level to represent policy, the ability to map 
between these different levels and to give feedback to the higher level of abstrac-
tion. HQML is the only language from our selection that proposes an automatic 
mapping. Others such as PPL will consider the mapping in their future work. 
Languages such as PDL and QuO, originally system- or network-oriented, begin 
to implement mechanisms to translate low level information into application level 
information and therefore give feedback to the application and users. All the lan-
guages we selected use notations and parameters requiring technical knowledge. 
They are therefore not really understandable to an end-user.  
• Ponder, ISPS and PPL for the technique used to represent policies. Ponder is 
interesting due to its policy language approach and its specific policy objects that 
provide a flexibility, an abstraction and a completeness in the specification. How-
ever, the rule based approach is interesting at network level when the interaction 
with standard policy models is required. The ‘mapping’ is easier. Finally the most 
user-friendly is LaSCO with its graph-based policy representation but the system 
management stays quite complex. 
• Of all the notions we studied, the most important is the notion of group (in partic-
ular for domain and role). Defining domains by grouping together the elements 
(objects, users, etc.) permits to reduce the number of policies. Roles enable the 
reuse of policies. These two notions, found in Automated Manager and Ponder, 
contribute to the scalability of large systems.  
The need of policy detection conflict is also important. Among the studied languages, 
ASL, ISPS, and Ponder propose this functionality. ASL proposes specific conflict 
resolution policies. In ISPS, a conflict is resolved using algorithms that refine re-
quirement policies into implemented policies. In Ponder, meta-policies are used to 
forbid the simultaneous execution of conflicting policies. Currently, there is a lack of 
automatic method for checking policy conflicts. Ways to detect statically potential 
conflicts are reported in [39], [24].  
Another important criterion for the security specification is the policy release. This 
permits to identify how policies are triggered in the selected languages. The languages 
can be classified as Proactive or Reactive. In proactive languages the policies are 
represented by the condition(s) to verify to execute the action(s). Therefore, potential 
problems are detected and handled before they actually happen [25]. In reactive lan-
guages the policies are triggered according to the systems events occurrence. These 
are event-based languages. The policies can be triggered when a security violation 
occurs. The majority of languages we selected represent policies with a proactive 
approach. LaSCO, PDL and Policy Driven are examples of reactive languages. Cur-
rently, with the complexity of environment and applications that run it, the capability 
of languages to specify both proactive and reactive mechanism is essential. PDN, 
QuAL, Ponder and DLSS have the capability to trigger the policies using both proac-
tive and reactive approaches. For our ideal language, we would choose such a lan-
guage. 
In short, we would choose Ponder as a basis since it is the most complete. It permits 
security, QoS and more general policy specification and we would add specific poli-
cies for the security of communication, the possibility to express high level policies 
and mapping and feedback mechanisms. It would not be the ideal language but would 
be a good alternative. 
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